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WEST VIRGINIA LJW QUARTERLY
FEDERAL LIENS*
CHARLES C. WHITE**
It is the purpose of this paper to discuss the various liens,
arising under United States laws or statutes, that may affect
the title to real estate. Since the writer discussed the sub-
ject of bankruptcy at the 1922 meeting of this association no
discusison of that subject is included in this paper.
JUDGMENT LIENS
We will first take up the subject of the lien of judgments
rendered in federal courts. And since the local law in
many of our states, in the matter of judgments in state
courts, is such that no advantage can be taken of the provi-
sions of the federal law of 1888 on the subject of judgment
liens, it will be necessary first to discuss the law as it was
prior to the Act of August 1, 1888.
Prior to 1888 there was no federal statute specifically
dealing with the subject of judgment liens. Revised Stat-
utes §721,1 originally passed in 17,89, provides that
"The laws of the several states, except where the con-
stitution, treaties, or statutes of the United States other-
wise require or provide,. shall be regarded as rules of
decision in trials at common law, in the Courts of the
United States, in cases where they apply."
Revised Statutes §9162 passed in 1872 is as follows:
"The party recovering a judgment in any common law
cause in any circuit or district court, shall be entitled to
similar remedies upon the same, by execution or other-
wise, to reach the property of the judgment debtor, as are
now provided in like causes by the laws of the state in
which such court is held, or by any such laws hereafter
enacted, which may be adopted by general rules of such
circuit or district court; and such courts may, from time
to time, by general rules adopt such state laws as may
* An address delivered at the Twentieth Annual Convention of The American
Title Association, Atlantic City, New Jersey, September 7, 8, 9, 10, 1926. Reprinted
by permission of the American Title Association.
** Title Officer of The Land Title Abstract and Trust Company, Cleveland, Ohio.
U. S. Comp. St. 1538.
21U. S. Comp. St. 1540.
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FEDERAL LIENS
hereafter be in force in such state in relation to remedies
upon judgments, as aforesaid, by execution or otherwise."
Revised Statutes §9673 passed in 1840 is that
"Judgments and decrees rendered in a circuit or dis-
trict court, within any state, shall cease to be liens on
real estate or chattels real, in the same manner and at
like periods as judgments and decrees of the courts oi
such state cease, by law, to be liens thereon."
Under the above statutes there is a long line of decisions
to the effect that the lien of a judgment in a federal court
has the same effect throughout the territorial jurisdiction of
the court as the lien of a state court has throughout its ter-
ritorial jurisdiction.
As authority for the above statement we quote Massingil
v. Downs4 as follows:
"In those states where the judgment on the execution
of a state court creates a lien only within the county in
which the judgment is rendered, it has not been doubted
that a similar proceeding in the circuit court of the
United States, would create a lien to the extent of its
jurisdiction."
In Barth v. McKeever,5 it was decided that a federal judg-
ment, rendered in a state where the judgments of a state
court attach to after-acquired land, will in such state attach
to after-acquired land.
In United States v. Humphreys,6 it was decided that a fed-
eral judgment need not be recorded to be valid, even in a
state (Virginia) which required judgments in state courts to
be recorded. This case was decided prior to the passage of
the present federal statute of 1888.
In Bank v. Bates,7 it was said that
"Prior to 1888 the lien of judgments in the federal
courts was co-extensive with their territorial jurisdiction."
The only opinion that we have been able to find to the
effect that the lien of a federal court judgment may extend
U. S. Comp. St. 1608.
'7 How. (U. S.) 760 (1849). To the same effect see the following cases: Shrew
v. Jones, Fed. Case No. 12818 (1840) ; Lombard v. Bayard, Fed. Case No. 8469 (1848) ;
Cropsey v. Crandall, Fed. Case No. 8418 (1851) ; Ward v. Chamberlain. 17 U. S.
(L. ed.) 319 (1862) ; Barth v. McKeever, Fed. Case No. 1069 (1868) ; Carroll w. Wat-
kin. Fed. Case No. 2457 (1870) ; U. S. v. Scott, Fed. Case No. 16242 (1878).
'Supra, n. 4.
Fed. Case No. 15422 (1879).
44 Fed. 646 (1890).
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beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the court rendering the
judgment is Prevost v. Gorrell,8 decided by a federal court
sitting in Pennsylvania as follows:
"In the United States courts, when a state is divided
into several districts, a judgment obtained in one district
is a lien upon defendant's real estate in all parts of the
state."
This opinion, which seems to stand alone, and which
seems not to have been followed by federal courts in states
other than Pennsylvania, was based upon Revised Statutes
§9859 which reads as follows:
"All writs of execution upon judgments or decrees ob-
tained in a circuit or district court, in any state which is
divided into two or more districts may run and be exe-
cuted in any part of the state; but it shall be issued from
and be made returnable to the court wherein the judg-
ment was obtained."
The court says that
"The right of lien depends upon the right of execution
and by Revised Statutes 985 all writs of execution may
run and be executed in all parts of the state."
Even prior to 1888 the above decision seems never to
have been followed elsewhere than in Pennsylvania, and
the statute of 1888 now regulates the lien and the territor-
ial extent thereof.
We come now to the Act of August 1, 1888, Ch. 72910
which, as originally enacted, read as follows:
"See. 1. That judgments and decrees rendered in a cir-
cuit or district court of the United States within any
state, shall be liens on property throughout such state in
the same manner and to the same extent and unqer the
same conditions only as if such judgment had been ren-
dered by a court of general jurisdiction of such state.
Provided, That whenever the laws of any state require
a judgment or decree of a state court to be registered, re-
corded, docketed, indexed, or any other thing to be done,
in a particular manner, or in a certain office or county, or
parish in the State of Louisiana, before a lien shall
attach, this act shall be applicable therein whenever and
' Fed. Case No. 11400 (1877).
o U. S. Comp. St. 1681.
10 25 Stat. L. 857. U. S. Comp. St. 1608.
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only whenever the laws of such state shall authorize the
judgment and decrees of the United States courts to be
registered, recorded, docketed, indexed, or otherwise con-
formed to the rules and requirements relating to the
judgments and decrees of the courts of the state.
"See. 3. Nothing herein shall be construed to require
the docketing of a judgment or decree of a United States
court, or the filing of a transcript thereof, in any state
office within the same county, or parish in the State of
Louisiana, in which the judgment or decree is rendered,
in order that such judgment or decree may be a lien on
any property within such county."
By the Act of March 2, 1895, Section 3 of the above act
was amended to read as follows:
"See. 3. That nothing herein contained shall be construed
to require the docketing of a judgment or decree of a
United States Court, or the filing of a transcript thereof,
in any state office within the same county, or the same
parish in the State of Louisiana, in which the judgment
or decree is rendered, in order that such judgment or de-
cree may be a lien on any property within such county, if the
Clerk of the United States Court be required by law to
have a permanent office and a judgment record open at
all times for public inspection in such county or parish."
On January 1, 1913, the original Section 3, which seems
not to have been specifically repealed by the Act of 1895
was repealed.
On January 1, 1917, the amended Section 3 was re-
pealed.'
Since January 1, 1917, therefore, the judgment lien law
has consisted of Section 1 of the original Act of August 1,
1888 as quoted above. From August 1, 1888 until Jan-
uary 1, 1917 it was not necessary to docket a federal judg-
ment in accordance with the state law in those cases where
the judgment was rendered by a federal court sitting in the
county where the land was situated. For instance a judg-
ment rendered in a federal court sitting in Cook County,
Illinois, would be a lien on all land in Cook County whether
or not the federal judgment was docketed or recorded in
accordance with any law providing for docketing or record-
u Act of August 23, 1916, Ch. 1397, 39 Stat. L. 531.
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ing a judgment of a state court. This has not been the
law since January 1, 1917 and all federal judgments,
whether rendered in the county where the land lies, or
whether rendered in another county, must comply with
Section 1 of the Act of August 1, 1888.
In those states whose judgment lien law is such that no
advantage can be taken of the proviso in Section 1 of the
ALct of August 1, 1888, and in those states whose judgment
lien law is such that advantage may be taken of the proviso,
but advantage of which has not been taken by proper legis-
lation, the law as to the lien of federal judgments seems
to be exactly what it was prior to 1888, since that part of
Section 1 preceding the proviso would seem to be merely
declaratory of the law as laid down in the numerous deci-
sions cited above. The declaratory part of the law is as
follows:
"That judgments and decrees rendered in a circuit
or district court of the United States within any state,
shall be liens on property throughout such state in the
same manner and to the same extent and under the same
conditions only as if such judgment had been rendered by
a court of general jurisdiction of such state."
An example of a state, whose judgment lien law is such
that no advantage can be taken of the proviso in the Act of
August 1, 1888, is Ohio. In Ohio a judgment is a general
lien from the date of rendition (and in the case of judg-
ments coming over from a previous term of court from the
first day of the term) and no provision is made for "regis-
tering, recording, docketing or indexing" the same in order
to make it a valid lien. In Ohio, therefore, and in other
states whose judgment lien laws are substantially similar,
judgments in federal courts are liens on all lands throughout
the district from the date of rendition (and in some cases
fi-om the 1st day of the term), and no provision can be made
for any sort of docketing or recording in any state office.
States whose judgment lien laws are such that advan-
tage can be taken of the proviso in the 1888 law are in the
same situation as Ohio unless and until laws shall have
been passed permitting the docketing or recording of fed-
eral judgments in exactly the same manner as local judg-
5
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ments are docketed or recorded. The word "exactly" is
used advisedly, for it was decided in Lineker v. Dillon,'12 that
a California law, which attempted to take advantage of the
proviso in the Act of August 1, 1888, but which in part placed
federal judgments in a less favorable position than judg-
ments in state courts, was inoperative. In other words, any
law passed by a state legislature, for the purpose of taking
advantage of the privilege permitted by the 1888 statute,
must put federal judgments exactly on a par with judg-
ments rendered in state courts.
It has been decided that a judgment that has become a
lien in any state, prior to the passage of a state law taking
advantage of the privilege provided by the judgment lien law
of August 1, 1888, is unaffected by the passage of such state
law, and does not have to be docketed in accordance with
the state law, to be a lien.
At page 733 of Bank v. Bank, l3 the court says:
"In this language (quoting the Act of August 1, 1888)
there is evidenced no intention to make the operation
of the law retrospective, neither is there any provision
giving time to register federal judgments already in ex-
istence with a view to preserving the liens thereof.
"A court will not give retrospective effect to a statute,
unless it is clear from the language used that the legis-
lature intended to give it that effect."
To the same effect as the Nebraska decision see Bank v.
Thompson.14 In this case there is a very complete history of
the whole question of the lien of federal judgments.
In United States v. Kendall,15 a question arose as to certain
judgments that had become liens in Louisiana, prior to 1913,
under the original Section 3 of the Judgment Lien Act of
August 1, 1888. It was held that the repeal of said Section 3
did not affect the lien of a judgment (in favor of the
United States) which had already attached, the court say-
ing at page 129 that "repealing statutes are not to be con-
strued as affecting vested rights."
The law as to the lien of federal judgments may be sum-
- 275 Fed. 460 (1921).
" 51 Neb. 766, 71 N. W. 1024 (1897).
'A 173 IM. 693, 50 N. E. 1089 (1898).
25 263 Fed. 126 (1920).
6
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 3 [1927], Art. 3
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol33/iss3/3
" WEST VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
marized as follows:
"In those states whose local laws provide for the dock-
eting, recording, registering, or indexing of judgments
rendered in state courts, with certain formalities, federal
judgments stand on the same footing 'if, as and when'
a law is passed permitting the docketing, recording, reg-
istering, or indexing of federal judgments in the same
manner as judgments of state courts. And this applies
to those counties in which United States courts sit, as well
as to counties where there is no United States court. In
all other states the judgment of a federal court through-
out its territorial jurisdiction has the same lien as the
judgment of a state court throughout its territorial juris-
diction. In other words if the, judgment of a common
pleas court in Ohio is a lien on all the lands within a
county, the judgment of a United States district court is
a lien throughout the district in Ohio in which it is ren-
dered, without any docketing or transcribing in any state
court, or in any state recording office."
The question is often raised as to whether or not a judg-
ment in favor of the United States stands upon the same
footing as a judgment in favor of a private individual.
In United States v. Houston,'6 it was held that the statutcs
of limitations do not run against a judgment in favor of the
United States.
In United States v. Minor i7 it was said that "the United
States may take the benefit of any state or federal statute,
though it is not bound by its limitations."
At page 380 of United States v. Noojin,18 the court says:
-"Under and by virtue of that statute (R. S. 916 above)
it is claimed that, when the United States voluntarily ap-
pears in a court of justice, it at the same time submits to
the law and places itself on an equality with other liti-
gants. This, indeed, may be true; but the courts have
universally held that such condition is always qualified
by the rule that neither the statute of limitations, nor
laches, will bar the government of the United States as
to any claim for relief in a purely governmental matter."
And again in United States v. Ingate,19 it was said:
10 48 Fed. 291 (1891).
1 285 Fed. 101 (1916).
3s 15 Fed. 877 (1907).
'P 48 Fed. 251 (1891).
In the following cases It was held that ','the party recovering a judgment" as used
in Revised Statutes 916 above. includes the United States: Green v. U. S., 9 Wall. (U.
S.) 655 (1869); Fink v. O'Neill, 106 U. S. 272 (1882); Clark e. Allen, 114 Fed. 874
(1902) ; Allen v. Clark, 126 Fed. "788 (1903).
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"It is well settled, that when the United States volun-
tarily appears in a court of justice, they at the same time
voluntarily submit to the law and place themselves on
an equality with other litigants. But this does not mean
that the United States is bound by the .statute of limi-
tations."
In Clark v. Allen,20 it was held that the United States had
no right, in connection with a judgment for a fine under
Revised Statutes §1041 (quoted below), to reach the home-
stead of a Virginia debtor, even though the homestead in
Virginia is subject to levy under a judgment for a fine in a
state court.
It would seem, therefore, that a judgment in favor of
the United States stands on the same footing as a judgment
in favor of a private person except that the United States
is not bound by the limitation provided by Revised Statutes
§967.
LIs PENDENS
Intimately connected with the subject of judgment liens
is the subject of Jis pendens. Most states have a lis pendens
statute providing substantially, that no one shall be deemed
to have notice of a suit affecting land until there shall have
been filed in the office where deeds are recorded a memo-
randum of the suit with a description of the land affected
thereby. Let us suppose, that in a state having a statutory
lis pendens law there is filed in the United States district
court sitting in Johnson County, a partition of lands situ-
ated in Bolivar County, or any sort of equitable action based
on diverse citizenship. Is a purchaser of the land in Boli-
var County charged with notice of the suit in the United
States court without any notice thereof being filed as a lis
pendens in said Bolivar County?
The cases on this subject are delightfully contradictory.
In Majors v. Cowell,21 it was decided that a state lis pendens
law does not apply to suits in federal courts, unless the stat-
ute has been incorporated into the rules of court.
The Indiana Supreme Court in Wilson v. Heflin,22 decided
- 114 Fed. 374 (1902).
= 81 Cal. 478 (1876).
"2 81 Ind. 35 (1881).
8
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that a state lis pendens statute has no application to suits
in federal courts.
In Jones v. Smith, 23 it was intimated, but not decided, by
a federal court sitting in New York, that state lis pendens
statutes are binding on federal courts.
In McCloskey v. Barr,2 4 it was decided that the Ohio ]is
pendens statute (which is not really a lis pendens statute at
all, but merely a statutory declaration of the general doc-
trine of lis pendens) is a rule of procedure and not a rule
of property and is therefore not binding on federal courts.
King v. Davis,2 5 affirmed by the Circuit Court of Appeals,
20
-was a case involving the Virginia lis pendens statute. The
court says:
"If the Virginia legislature were to enact a statute
making it the duty of the state court clerks to* record
menforanda of pending suits and attachments in the fed-
eral courts, there might possibly be no further difficulty.
But until that is done, the situation in respect to federal
pending suits and attachments is the same as that which
existed in respect to the lien of federal judgments prior
to the Congressional Statute of 1888 (Act of Aug. 1, 1888,
C. 729, 25 Stat. 357)."
It was decided in United States v. C. M. & St. P. Ry. Co.,
2 7
that the Minnesota lis pendens statute providing that the
pendency of an action relating to real estate is notice to
purchasers or incumbrancers only from the time of the fil-
ing of notice thereof in the office of the registrar of deeds
in the county in which the land is situated, is a rule of pro-
perty of the state relating to real estate, and applies to a
suit in equity pending in a federal court. It is interesting
to note that the Minnesota lis pendens statute does not
specifically mention judgments in federal courts.
In United States v. Calcasieu Timber Co.,2 8 decided by the
Circuit Court of Appeals, Fifth Circuit, it was decided that
a lis pendens statute of Louisiana, specifically including
federal judgments within its purview, is binding on federal
23 40 Fed. 314 (1889).
24 48 Fed. 130 (1891).
25 137 Fed. 222, 240 (1905).
2B 167 Fed. 676 (1906).
172 Fed. 271 (1909).
' 236 Fed. 196 (1916).
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courts. The court mentions King v. Davis,29 and notes that
the Louisiana statute meets the requirement laid down in
that case as a necessary prerequisite to making a state
lis pendens statute binding on federal courts. The Court of
Appeals in Tennis Coal Co. v. Sacker,30 has this to say
about the Kentucky lis pendens statute:
"We do not concur in the view urged by counsel for
the appellee, that a lis pendens notice, as provided by
that statute, is unnecessary in order that the proceeding,
sale or judgment may affect the title or interest of a sub-
sequent purchaser, lessee or encumbrancer, for value,
without notice, of real estate involved in a suit in a fed-
eral court where the real estate is situated in this state.
It is a rule pertaining to property in this state and it is
to be assumed, that the federal courts will give force and
effect to it, as the courts of the state will do."
It might be added that the Kentucky opinion is a dictum
only.
In United States v. Olzak,31 a United States district court
sitting in New Jersey decided that the state lis pendens law
had no application to a suit in equity to abate a nuisance
under the Volstead Act. In this case an alleged innocent
lessee was denied relief.
The only statute in Ohio having the characteristics of a
statutory lis pendens is G. C. 11301 providing that an action
affecting land brought in one county shall not be effective
in another county until notice thereof is filed in the record-
er's office of such other county. It was decided by the
Ohio Supreme Court in Stewart v. Railway Co.,32 that this
statute is not applicable to suits in federal courts.
In view of this conflict of authority, what are the title
men to do about this matter of lis pendens? It would seem
that unless they live in one of the jurisdictions in which it
has been decided by a United States Court that their lis pen-
dens statute applies to suits in federal courts, they had better
assume that their lis psndens statute does not apply to
such suits. In the meantime it would seem advisable for
Supra, n. 25.
Am. Ann. Cas. 1917E 529, 640 (1916).
" 6 F. (2d) 1014 (1925).
3253 Oh. St. 151 (1895).
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the American Title Association to get behind a federal act,
placing suits in federal courts within the purview of the
state lis pendens statutes, just as the Act of August 1, 1888,
placed federal judgments to some extent within the pur-
view of state judgment lien statutes.
EXECUTION LIENS
Aside from judgment liens there are certain liens that
may be created by the levy of execution, the existence of
which can be safely discovered only by a search of the
United States Marshal's execution docket.
The general law on the subject of execution liens is dis-
cussed in Volume 23 of Corpus Juris and is epitomized in
the following quotations:
"When the judgment is a lien upon real estate it has
been generally recognized by the courts that an execution
and levy thereunder upon such real estate creates no new
or separate lien from lien of the judgment.
"Where, however, land is levied on under an execution
issued on a judgment which is not a lien on such land,
the execution creates a lien on it.
"It is generally held, in the absence of a statute to the
contrary, that an execution is not a lien upon real estate,
independent of the judgment lien, without a levy.
"The general rule is that the writ is co-extensive with
the jurisdiction of the officer to whom it is delivered."
' 3
Federal execution liens are provided for by (§§ 916, 985
and 986) the United States Revised Statutes as follows:
"The party recovering a judgment in any common law
cause in any circuit or district court, shall be entitled to
similar remedies upon the same, by execution or other-
wise, to reach the property of the judgment debtor, as
are now provided in like causes by the laws of the state
in which such court is held, or by any such laws hereafter
enacted, which may be adopted by general rules of such
circuit or district court, and such courts may, from time
to time, by general rules, adopt such state laws as may
hereafter be in force in such state in relation to remedies
upon the judgments as aforesaid, by execution or other-
wise.
"All writs of execution upon judgments or decrees ob-
' 23 C. J. §§490, 492 and 494.
11
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tained in a circuit or district court, in any state which is
divided into two or more districts, may run and be exe-
cuted in any part of such state; but shall be issued from
and made returnable to, the court wherein the judgment
was obtained.
"All writs of execution upon judgments obtained for
the use of the United States in any court thereof, in one
state, may run and be executed in any other state, or in
any territory, but shall be issued from and made return-
able to, the court wherein the judgment was obtained.
'3 4
Just a word as to the application of these statutes. Sup-
pose that John Smith gets a judgment against John Jones
in the United States district court in a jurisdiction where
judgments are not a lien on after acquired property. If
Smith desires to make his judgment a lien on lands that
are acquired by Jones after the effective date of his judg-
ment he may under Revised Statutes § 916, have execution
issued and levied upon the after acquired lands.
Suppose that John Smith gets a judgment against John
Jones in the southern district of Ohio. In and of itself this
judgment is a lien on all of John Jones' land situated in any
county within the southern district. If Smith wants to at-
tach the judgment as a lien upon land owned by Jones in
a county of the northern district of Ohio, he may under Re-
vised Statutes §985 have execution issued and levied by
the marshal of the northern district on any lands within
the northern district.
Suppose that the United States gets a judgment against
John Jones in a United States district court in California.
By Revised Statutes §986 his judgment may be made to
attach as a lien in any other state in the union by having
execution issued and levied by the United States Marshal of
any district in which Jones may own land.
The only safe method by which the existence of the liens
created by execution and levy under the above sections (Re-
vised Statutes §§916, 985 and 986) of the United States Re-
vised Statutes can be discovered, is a search of the mar-
shal's execution docket. It is true that Revised Statutes
§916 adopts the state laws as to execution in existence in
1872, and provides that state execution laws passed after
1872 may be adopted by general rules and the federal
34 1016 U. S. Comp. Stat. §§1540. 1631 and 1632.
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courts. But it was held in Brown v. Fletcher,5 that Revised
Statutes §916 applies only to common law causes; in Steam
Stone Cutter Company v. Jones,6 and in Hudson v. Wood, 7
that it does not apply to equity cases; and in The Blanche
Page Company,38 and in Steam Stone Cutter Company v.
Sears,3 9 that it does not apply to executions in admiralty.
If a state statute in existence in 1872 provided for the re-
cording of execution levies in the recorder's office; or if
in any particular state a law has been passed since 1872
providing for such recording, and if in that same state the
federal courts have by general rules adopted such state
statute; then in such state one could rely, for execution in
common law causes, upon a search in the recorder's office
for federal executions. But because of the exceptions to
the operation of the statute noted above, it is unsafe to rely
upon anything but a search in the marshal's execution
docket for a federal execution. In my own state of Ohio,
the local law is such that a search of1 the marshal's execu-
tion docket is absolutely essential. And I presume that
this is true for many other states.
In connection with this matter we quote from Lamaster v.
Keeler :40
"The provisions of Revised Statutes §914 do not apply
to remedies upon judgment; butthose remedies, being
governed by the provisions of Revised Statutes §916, are
confined to such remedies as were provided by the laws
of the state in force when Revised Statutes §916 was
passed, or re-enacted, or by subsequent laws of the state
adopted by the federal court in the manner provided for
in that section."
FINES AND PENALTIES
The discussion of execution liens leads naturally to the
subject of judgments for fines and penalties concerning
which there are, in the opinion of the writer, some mistaken
ideas current in the title world.
z 239 Fed. 860 (1917).
w 13 Fed. 567 (1882).
" 119 Fed. 764 (1903).
' Fed. Case No. 1524 (1879).
. 9 Fed. 8 (1881).
" 123 U. S. 376 (1887).
13
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As to the general effect of a judgment for a fine, we
quote from Corpus Juris:
"After a fine has been imposed by the sentence of the
court, it is regarded as in the nature of a debt of record
due the state, and ordinarily it may be enforced by exe-
cution against the defendant's property both at common
law and under statutes in many jurisdictions.
"Some statutes provide that a judgment imposing a
fine shall constitute a lien on defendant's property."
'41
The only provision of the United States statutes with ref-
erence to judgments for fines and penalties is Revised Stat-
utes §104142 which is as follows:
"In all criminal or penal causes in which judgment or
sentence has been or shall be rendered, imposing the pay-
ment of a fine or penalty, whether alone or with any other
kind of punishment, the said judgment, so far as the fine
or penalty is concerned, may be enforced by execution
against the property of the defendant in like manner as
judgments in civil cases are enforced: Provided, that where
the judgment directs that the defendant shall be impris-
oned until the fine or penalty imposed is paid, the issue
of execution on the judgment shall not operate to dis-
charge the defendant from imprisonment until the
amount of the judgment is collected or otherwise paid."
It was held in Fink v. O'Neill,'" that the United States as a
plaintiff in a civil action stands on the same footing as an in-
dividual under Revised Statutes §916 above, but in Clark v.
Allen,44 it was held that said Revised Statutes §916 does not
apply to criminal cases. In the latter case it was held that:
"Revised Statutes §1041, providing that judgments in
criminal or penal causes as to the fine or penalty may be
enforced by execution against the property of the de-
fendant in like manner as judgments in civil cases are
enforced, means only that the government in enforcing
judgments for fines and penalties is not restricted to mere
imprisonment of the defendant, but may proceed also by
execution against his property."
It was also held in Clark v. Allen 5 that "execution on judg-
ments under Revised Statutes §1041 can be levied .to the same
0 25 C. J. §§1155 and 1164.
I U. S. Comp. St. 1705 (1916).3 106 U. S. 272 (1882).
" 114 Fed. 374 (1902).
' Supra, n. 44.
14
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 33, Iss. 3 [1927], Art. 3
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol33/iss3/3
WE8T VIRGINIA LAW QUARTERLY
extent, and only to the same extent, as judgments in civil
cases." The decision in that case was affirmed by the
Circuit Court of Appeals. 46
In In re Teuscher,47 the court says that Revised Statutes
§1041 for the first time gave the United States the right of
execution on fines and penalties.
It would seem, therefore, that a judgment for a fine or
penalty in a federal court is not a lien on the property of
the defendant, and can be made a lien only by the levy of
execution. That a judgment for a fine stands. on a different
footing from the ordinary judgment is further shown by a
line of cases which hold that such judgments can not be
collected against the estate of the defendant. It was said
in United States v. Mitchell,48 affirmed by the Circuit Court of
Appeals, 49 that "the purpose of a fine imposed in a criminal
case is the punishment of the defendant personally, and
while Revised Statutes §1041 provides that fines may be
collected by execution as in civil judgments, there is no
provision making it a debt, and the fine can not be collected
against defendant's estate."
Under §1 of the Judgment Lien Act of August 1, 1888,
which provides that judgments and decrees rendered in a
federal court shall be liens to the same extent as judgments
in state courts, it might be argued that in those states where
judgments for fines and penalties in state courts are liens,
judgments for fines and penalties in federal courts should
also be liens. But there seems to be no more reason for
applying this act to federal judgments than for applying
Revised Statutes §916, and we have shown above 0 that Re-
vised Statutes §916 has been held inapplicable to judgments
in criminal proceedings. It would of course apply to a
civil judgment acquired by the United States. 51
The liens created by levy of execution under judgments
for fines and penalties in criminal cases, like the other exe-
126 Fed. 738 (1903).
" Fed. Case No. 13846 (1877).
"8 163 Fed. 1014 (1908).
40 178 Fed. 254 (1909). To the same effect see U. S. v. Pomeroy, 162 Fed. 279
(1907) and Dyar v. U. S., 186 Fed. 614 (1911).
00 Clark v. Allen, 114 Fed. 374 (1902).
"1 See Fink v. O'Neill, supra, n. 48.
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cution liens discussed above, can be safely discovered only
by searching the United States Marshal's Execution Docket.
BONDS AND RECOGNIZANCES
Another subject on which there are, in the opinion of the
writer, many misconceptions in some parts of the title
world, is the matter of criminal bonds and recognizances in
'federal courts.
A recognizance has been defined as "an obligation en-
tered into by a person with a court of record, whereby he
binds himself under a penalty to do or not to do a particular
thing required of him by the court, and which is made a
part of the record." In the ordinary criminal recognizance
the principal and sureties "acknowledge themselves to owe
to the United States of America the sum of $ ...................... I
to be levied of their goods and chattels, lands and tene-
ments, to and for the use of the United States, in case
default be made in the condition of this recognizance, which
is that if the said (principal) shall personally appear in
court to answer to (a certain indictment) and shall then and
there abidt. the order and judgment of the court, this recogni-
zance shall be void; otherwise to remain in full force and
effect."
If the defendant does not appear in court (or perform
whatever other act the bond is given to secure) the bond is
thereby forfeited and the government may proceed to en-
force the obligation against the principal and sureties,
either by the common law writ of scire facias or by a separate
suit.
Whether the government shall proceed by scire facias or by
a separate' suit is a matter of choice with the district attor-
ney. He will usually follow the same method of procedure
as is followed in the courts of the state in. which his district
is situated, although it has been decided " 2 that it is not neces-
sary that the local procedure be followed.
But whatever the procedure, whether by scire facias or by
independent action it is submitted that there is no suit pend-
ing, in so far as the bond or recognizance is concerned, until
a forfeiture has been declared, and the writ of scire facias
0 U. S. v. Insley, 64 Fed. 221 (1893); Insley V. U. S., 150 U. S. 512 (1893).
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has been issued, or a separate suit has been started thereon;
and there is no judgment until the writ has been returned
and the conditional judgment has thereby been made abso-
lute, or until a judgment has been rendered in the inde-
pendent action.58
In Kirk v. United States,"4 affirmed by the Circuit Court of
Appeals, 55 it was decided that scire facias is a proper proced-
ure on a forfeited recognizance, and that, being in the nature
of an original action, the safety must be personally served. 06
It has been contended in my own jurisdiction that that part
of the ordinary criminal recognizance, which reads "and shall
then and there abide the order and judgment of the court"
binds the sureties to pay the fine imposed by the court. But
it was decided by Judge Westenhaver in the case of United
States v. Rudner,57 that this is true only of supersedeas bonds,
and not of the ordinary bail bond or recognizance.
M As authority for the above conclusion we cite the following authorities: Winder
s. Caldwell, 14 How. (U. S.) 434 (1852) "A saire facias is a judicial writ used to enforce
the execution of some matter of record on which it is usually founded; but though a
judicial writ, or writ of execution, it Is so far an original that the defendant may
pl.ad to it. As it discloses the facts on which it is founded, and requires an answer
from the defendant, it is in the nature of a declaration, and the plea is properly to the
writ."
U. S. v. Winsted, 12 Fed. 50 (1882) "A recognizance duly entered is a debt of
record, and the object of a scire fadas is to notify the cognizer to show cause, if any he
have, wherefore the cognizee shoul4'not have execution of the same thereby acknow-
ledged. The recognizance is in the r(ature of a conditional judgment, and the retorded de-
fault makes it absolute, subject only_0 such matters of legal avoidance as may be
shown by plea, or such matters of relief as may induce the court to remit or mitigate
the forfeiture."
0' 131 Fed. 331 (1904).
137 Fed. 753 (1905).
' Hollister v. U. S., 145 Fed. 773 (1906). "A scire facias on a forfeited recogni-
zance takes the place of the declaration in an original suit, and its sufficiency must be
determined by its averments, apart from the record on which the writ issued."
U. S. v. Taylor, 157. Fed. 718 (1907). "A recognizance in a criminal case is in the
nature of a judgment confessed of record, and a proceeding thereon by escro facao
after forfeiture is merely to confirm such judgment."
Ewing v. U. S., 240 Fed. 241 (1917). "l. A recognizance or bail bond mfy be
enforced by scire facias or civil action; debt lying on the recognizance. 2. A writ of
scire facaa is considered both as process and as a declaration, and informalities which
may he taken advantage of by demurrer, can be cured by amendment. S. The United
States may adopt the remedy of scire facies to recover on bail bond, and have judgment
entered after return of process if no sufficient cause is shown for setting aside the
conditional judgment."
U. S. v. Davenport, 226 Fed. 425 (1920). "1. A bail bond i a contract and an
action to enforce it is a civil action. 2. A recognizance in a criminal case is a judg-
ment confessed of record and a proceeding by scire facias after forfeiture is merely to
confirm such Judgment."
We refer also to Volume 122 of American State Reports as follows:
"In cases of this class (criminal recognizances), however, the court generally
enters some order or declaration which is equivalent in effect to a judgment nisi, and
the subsequent proceeding by sciro faciae may well be regarded as resting on judg-
ment rather than upon the recognizance or other writing. So far as the courts have
spoken on the subject, they seem to regard the remedy by seire fasas as cumulative
rather than as exclusive, and therefore, allow it to be brought by action at law upon
the bond against the sureties thereon." (Note 122 Am. St. Rep. 75.)
"The writ of scire facies answered the double purpose of a writ and a declaration."
(Note 122 Am. St. Rep. 92.)
"No petition or complaint is necessary to obtain a edre faciae, or perhaps it
would be more correct to say that scire facies is a complaint as well as a writ."
Note 122 Am. St. Rep. 92.)
57 U. S. 1923.
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It will appear in our discussion of the Volstead Act below
that the bond given in a padlock case binds the principal
and sureties to pay all fines and penalties for violating the
injunction against the illegal sale of liquor on the padlocked
premises.
REVENUE LIENS
The lien of internal revenue taxes (except the estates
tax) is governed by Revised Statutes §318658 which reads
as follows:
"If any person liable to pay any tax neglects or refuses
to pay same after demand, the amount shall be a lien in
favor of the United States, from the time when the assess-
ment list was received by the collector, except when other-
wise provided, until paid, with the interest, penalties and
costs that may accrue in addition thereto upon all prop-
erty and rights to property belonging to such person:
Provided, however, that such lien shall not be valid as
against any mortgagee, purchaser, or judgment creditor
until notice of such lien shall be filed by the collector in
the office of the clerk of the district court of the district
within which the property, subject to such lien, is situ-
ated: Provided further, Whenever any state by appropriate
legislation authorizes the filing of such notice in the of-
fice of the registrar or recorder of deeds of the counties
of that state, or in the State of Louisiana in the parishes
thereof, then such lien shall not be valid in that state as
against any mortgagee, purchaser, or judgment creditor
until such notice shall be filed in the office of the regis-
trar or recorder of deeds of the county or counties, or
parish or parishes in the State of Louisiana, within which
the property subject to the lien is situated."
The law prior to 1913 was substantially that part of the
above quoted act which preceded "provided." The two
provisos were added by the Act of March 4, 1913.
The questions naturally arising as to the lien created by
Revised Statutes §3186 are:
1. When does the lien attach?
2. To what property does it attach?
3. What is its relative priority?
4. How long does it continue as a lien?
5. By what legal proceedings may it be removed?
1s 1916 U. S. Comp. St. §5908.
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When does the lien attach? Prior to 1913 as to all persons,
both lienee and third parties, the lien attached at the time
the assessment list was received by the collector. This is
still the law as to the lienee, but as to purchasers, mortga-
gees, or judgment creditors the lien attaches since 1913, either
(a) upon filing notice of lien with clerk of the district court,
in those states which have not provided for filing the same
in the office in which deeds are recorded, or (b) upon filing
of notice in the office of the recorder of deeds, in those states
which have taken advantage of the permission granted by
the 1913 amendment.
To what property does it attach? The best answer to this
question is found in United States v. Pacific Railroad Corti-
pany,"9 in which the court says that "the lien created by Re-
vised Statutes §3186 relates back upon demand, to the time
when the tax was due, but only attaches to the property
belonging to the person from whom the tax was due at the
time when the demand for payment was made."
No cases have been found discussing the question as to
whether or not the lien attaches to after acquired property.
We must, therefore, be guided in this matter by the general
law as to liens, which according to 17 C. J. 324 is that "in
the absence of provision showing an intention to extend the
lien to after-acquired property, a lien attaches only to prop-
erty on hand at the time it is created."0
What is the relative priority of the lien? It is sometimes
argued that, since the revenue tax is a debt due the govern-
ment-, the lien of the tax is paramount and will override
prior liens. The so-called "priority" statute relative to
debts due the United States is Revised Statutes §3466,(1
which reads as follows:
"Whenever any person indebted to the United States
is insolvent, or whenever the estate of any deceased
debtor, in the hands of the executors or administrators,
is insufficient to pay all the debts due from the de-
ceased, the debts due to the United States shall be first
satisfied; and the priority hereby established shall extend
as well to cases in which a debtor, not having sufficient
property to pay all his debts, makes a voluntary assignment
" 1 Fed. 97 (1880).
co Citing Borden v. Croak, 181 111. 68, 22 N. E. '93 (1889). and Thornaberry v.
Thornberry, 68 S. W. 129 (Ky. 1902).
al 1916 U. S. Comp. St., §6372.
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thereof, or in which the estate and effects of an abscond-
ing, concealed, or absent debtor are attached by process
of law, as to cases in which an act of bankruptcy is com-
mitted."
The general rule as to the priority of statutory liens is
stated as follows in 17 C. J. 329:
"The priorities of statutory liens are generally regu-
lated by the statutes creating them. But although it is
within the power of a legislature to give a statutory lien
priority over other liens, as a general rule a statutory lien
does not take precedence over a prior contractual lien,
unless the statute clearly shows or declares an intention
to cause the statutory lien to override the prior lien."
As to priority of tax liens generally we find the following
statement in 37 Cyc. 1143:
"It is competent for the legislature to make taxes a
paramount lien on the property of the tax payer, and this
has been done in many states, the consequence being
that the lien for taxes takes precedence of every other
lien or claim upon the property of whatsoever kind, how-
ever created, and whether attaching before or after the
assessment of the taxes. But this preference does not
belong to -the tax lien unless it is so declared by statute
and a law, for example, which merely enacts that taxes
shall be a lien on real property does not make them a
first lien."
The overwhelming weight of authority is to the effect
that Revised Statutes §3466 has to do only with the distri-
bution of an estate and has nothing to do with the question
of priority of liens.
In United States v. Sheriff, 62 the United States had a judg-
ment under the revenue laws. A private individual had a
prior judgment in a state court. It was held that the law
giving priority to claims due the United States must not
be construed so as to destroy a prior lien.
In United States v. Insurance Company,63 it was decided
that the priority of the United States cannot be asserted as
against a prior bona fide conveyance or mortgage.
In United States v. Cutts,64 it was held that the United
States had no right of priority over a prior pledge of stock.
02 Fed. Case No. 16276 (1803).
c3 Fed. Caae No. 14942 (1823).
01 Fed. Case No. 14912 (1832).
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In Brent v. Bank,65 we find the following:
"The preference provided by Revised Statutes §3466
does not prevent the transmission of the property, but
gives the United States a. preference in payment out of
the proceeds. This preference is in the appropriation of
the debtor's estate; so that if, before it has attached, the
debtor has contracted or mortgaged his property, or it
has been transferred in the ordinary course of business,
neither are over-reached by the statutes; it has never
been decided that it affects any lien, general or specific,
existing when the event took place which gave the
United States a claim of priority."
Also United States v. Duncan,66
"It has been uniformly held, in all the cases, that the
priority of the United States does not disturb any specific
lien, nor the forfeited lien of a judgment, that is, it does
not supersede a mortgage on land, nor a'judgment made
perfect by the issue of an execution and a levy on real
estate. But in case of a general lien it is not so clear."
The case of In Re Wiley6 7 decided that under §64a of the
Bankruptcy Act taxes due the United States will pro-rate
with state taxes and have no priority under Revised Stat-
utes §3466. The court says:
"A tax has such lien and priority, and only such, as is
given it by statute. 37 Cyc. 1138, 1143. The common
law preference of the sovereign is said not to exist in favor
of the United States, save as continued by statute. United
States v. Bank of North Carolina, 6 Pet. (U. S.) 29. A
lien is provided for federal taxes by Revised Statutes
§3186, but no special priority is stated. Debts due the
United States are given a first priority, apparently ex-
-tending to cases of bankruptcy, by Revised Statutes
§3466: but taxes are hardly to be considered debts.
(United States v. Anderson, 203 U. S. 483),"
It was also held in In Re A. E. Fountain, Incorporated,8
that taxes due the United States have no priority over
state taxes in bankruptcy.
There is one decision contra to the last two cases. In United
States v. San Juan County,60 it was held that United States
10 Pet. (U. S.) 596 (1836).
Fed. Case No. 15003 (1850).
292 Fed. 900 (1923).
,8 295 Fed. 873 (1924).
280 Fed. 120 (1922).
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taxes have priority o~er state taxes.
It was held in In Re Baltimore Pearl Hominy Company7
0
that there is no lien under Revised Statutes §3186 until de-
mand, and that the United States has no priority under
§64a of the Bankruptcy Act until the demand establishes the
lien. The court says that no lien is created by the priority
statute7 ' and that the priority of debts due the United
States is not established so long as the debtor continues in
possession of the property.
Ferris v. Chic-Mint Company,72 is a New Jersey equity case
involving the priority of revenue liens. In this case it was
held, (1) that a mortgage is prior to a subsequently as-
sessed revenue lien. (2) That a mortgage is prior to a
prior assessed, but subsequently filed (under Revised Stat-
utes §3186) lien. (3) The revenue lien is also subsequent
to a judgment lien.
The only case squarely holding a revenue lien paramount
to a prior mortgage is The Melissa Trask.7 3 In this case the
government had a lien for "head taxes" on immigrants un-
der the Immigration Act and it was °decided that this lien
was prior to a mortgage that had previously been placed
on the ship under the Ship Mortgage Act of 1920. This
case might be distinguished from the case of a general
lien in that the lien is a lien on a specific piece of property,
to-wit, the ship.
A very interesting, and to our way of thinking, a very
proper criticism of this case is found in 38 Harvard Law
Review 1060.
It seems to the writer that Revised Statutes §3186 very
clearly indicates that no priority is intended. It says that
the tax "shall be a lien * * * upon all property and rights
to property" of the person against whom the tax is assessed.
If the tax delinquent has made a prior mortgage his prop-
erty is to that extent diminished and the lien attaches only
to the equity. That this is the proper construction of this
statute is shown by the 1924 revision of Revised Statutes
§3207, giving a prior lien claimant the right to initiate pro-
10 294 Fed. 921 (1923).
.1 Rev. Stat. §3466.
72 124 At]. 677 (1924).
73 295 Fed. 781 (1923).
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ceedings to remove the lien. This statute will be discussed
later.
How long does the lien continue? Revised Statutes §3186
says the taxes shall be a lien until paid. While it is true
that the recent revenue acts have placed certain limitations
on the time for assessment of the tax, and upon the time in
which suit must be brought to collect the same, it is probable
that these limitations have nothing to do with the lien pro-
vided by Revised Statutes §3186. The general law on this
subject, as laid down in 17 C. J. 700, is as follows:
"The rule sustained by the weight of authority * * * is
that where the security for a debt is a lien on the prop-
erty, personal or real, the lien is not impaired because the
remedy at law for the recovery of the debt is barred."
By what legal proceeding may the lien be removed? The
only method is that laid down by Revised Statutes §3207
(as amended by §1030 of the Revenue Act of 1924). This
section as amended reads as follows:
"Section 3207. (a) In any case where there has been
a refusal or neglect to pay any tax, and it has become
necessary to seize and sell real estate to satisfy the same,
the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may direct a bill
in chancery to be filed, in a district court of the United
States, to enforce the lien of the United States for tax
upon any real estate, or to subject any real estate owned
by the delinquent, or in which he has any right, title or
interest, to the payment of such tax. All persons having
liens upon or claiming any interest in the real estate
sought to be subjected as aforesaid, shall be made parties
to such proceedings, and be brought into court as pro-
vided in other suits in chancery therein. And the said
court shall, at the term next after the parties have been
duly notified of the proceedings, unless otherwise ordered
by the court, proceed to adjudicate all matters involved
therein, and finally determine the merits of all claims to
and liens upon the real estate in question, and, in all
cases where a claim or interest of the United States there-
in is established, shall decree a sale of such real estate,
by the proper officer of the court, and a distribution of the
proceeds of such sale according to the findings of the
court in respect to the interests of the parties and of the
United States.
"(b) Any person having a lien upon or any interest in
such real estate, notice of which has been duly filed of rec-
ord in the jurisdiction in which the real estate is located,
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prior to the filing of notice of the lien of the United States
as provided by §3186 of the Revised Statutes as amend-
ed, or any person purchasing the real estate at a sale to
satisfy such prior lien or interest, may make written re-
quest to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue to direct
the filing of a bill of chancery as provided in subdivision
(a), and if the Commissioner fails to direct the filing of
such bill within, six months after receipt of such written
request, such person or purchaser may, after giving no-
tice to the Commissioner, file a petition in the district
court of the United States, for the district in which the
real estate is located, praying leave to file a bill for a
final determination of all claims to or liens upon the real
estate in question. After a full hearing in open court,
the district court may in its discretion enter an order
granting leave to file such bill, in which the United States
and all persons having liens upon or claiming any inter-
est in the real estate shall be made parties. Service on
the United States shall be had in the manner provided by
§§5 and 6 of the act of March 3, 1887, entitled 'An Act
to provide for the bringing of suits against the Govern-
ment of the United States.' Upon the filing of such bill
the district court shall proceed to adjudicate the matters
involved therein, in the same manner as in the case of
bills filed under subdivision (a) of this section. For the
purpose of such adjudication, the assessment of the tax
upon which the lien of the United States is based shall be
conclusively presumed to be valid, and all costs of the
proceedings on the petition and the bill shall be borne by
the person filing the bill."
As many of this association know, Mr. H. R. Chittick of
The Lawvyerq Title & Ttust Co., New York, was instrumen-
tal in having introduced in Congress a law permitting the
United States to be made a party to foreclosure proceedings
involving revenue liens, but the most that could be accom-
plished was the above revision of ReAsed Statutes §3207.
It is an extremely unsatisfactory procedure and it is un-
fortunate that the bill permitting the foreclosure of these
liens in state courts did not pass.
An interesting case in connection with revenue liens is
Bosset v. Miller.7 4 In this case it was decided that
the amount made on an execution sale by another creditor,
cannot be paid to the Collector of Internal Revenue on a
revenue lien. The syllabus in this case is as follows:
1 2 Woodw. Dec. (Pa.) 40 (1871).
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"While Revised Statutes §3186 gives the government a
lien, and provides a method of enforcing the lien by levy
and sale, it does not make the the amount of the arrears
payable out of the proceeds of sale under an execution
upon a judgment in the Common Pleas Court in favor of
another."
It would seem, therefore, that even if the Collector of
Internal Revenue voluntarily appears in an action in a state
court, the lien of a revenue tax can not be properly adjudi-
cated therein. The lien created by Revised Statutes §3186
can not be foreclosed in a state court. The only method
of removing the lien by judicial process is that laid down
by Revised Statutes §3207 as amended by §1030 of the
Revenue Act of 1924.
It is well to remember, in those states where no provision
is made for filing revenue liens in the recorder's office, that
no provision is made by the statute for indexing the liens
by the district court clerk. In Cleveland it was always the
custom to index the liens in the civil court index and we pre-
sume this custom is general. But in this matter the title
man must govern himself in his search by the local custom.
It is also well to remember that the filing of the lien in
the office of the district court clerk and in the 
county re:"
corder's office in those states which have provided for filing
the same, is only for the protection of the purchaser, mort-
gagee, or judgment creditor. As to the tax delinquent him-
self and as to all persons not coming within the three classes
mentioned, the tax is a lien as soon as the assessment list is
received by the collector.
In case of payment of the tax the Collector of Internal
Revenue issues a certificate of discharge (Form 669) which
reads as follows:
"I hereby certify that the taxes enumerated below,
heretofore assessed against the following named person,
firm or company, have been paid in full, together with
all penalties, costs, and interest; and that the lien for
such taxes, penalties, etc., created by §3186 of the Re-
vised Statutes of the United States, as amended by Act
March 4, 1913 (37 Stat. 1016), has thereby been dis-
charged in full."
This certificate is filed with the district court clerk in
those states having no statute permitting the recording of
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revenue liens, and with the county recorder, or other re-
cording officer, in those states having a law permitting the
recording of revenue liens.
The question has been raised as to whether a lien which
had attached prior to the 1913 revision of Revised Statutes
§3186, must be re-filed in the county recorder's office of any
state which has passed a law providing for the recording
of these liens, in order that it may be a lien in such state.
There are no decisions on this question, but it seems to the
writer that the cases cited above, with reference to the anal-
ogous situation arising out of the judgment lien law, are
decisive of this question, and that liens which had attached
prior to the passage of a state statute, remain liens with-
out re-filing under the state statute.
There are certain methods of collecting revenue taxes
that may be the source of trouble to the title searcher. Re-
vised Statutes §3190 et seq. provide for collection of the
tax by distraint and sale of chattels and Revised Statutes
§3196 provides that "when goods, chattels or effects suffi-
cient to satisfy the taxes imposed upon any person are not
found by the collector, or deputy collector, he is authorized
to collect the same by seizure and sale of real estate." Re-
vised Statutes §3197 provides for notice to the delinquent,
publishing in a newspaper and by posting notices, and a
sale at public auction. Revised Statutes §3198 provides for
the issuance of a certificate of purchase. If the land is not
redeemed within one year, the collector or deputy collector
makes a deed for the same to the purchaser, which deed is
prima facie evidence of the facts therein recited. Revised
Statutes §3200 provides that lands anywhere in the state may
be seized and sold under the above provisions. It was decided
in Sheridan v. Allen,75 a case involving personal property, that
only the rights of the person against whom the tax is
claimed is affected by the sale, and that it does not cut off
the rights of other parties.
The only possible method of discovering distraint sales by
the collector is a search in the office of the collector of in-
ternal revenue, as there is no provision for filing the col-
lector's levy and sale, either in the clerk's or marshal's of-
fice. In twenty years' experience the writer has never run
' 153 Fed. 568 (1907).
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across a sale of real estate by the collector under the provi-
sions of the above statute.
Revised Statutes §3217 provides for similar proceedings
by the United States Marshal against a delinquent revenue
collector.
Revised Statutes §3627 provides for the issuance of a
warrant of distress against any absconding officer and a sale
of the real estate of such person by the United States Mar-
shal.
Revised Statutes §3628 provides the same remedy against
the sureties of an absconding officer.
Revised Statutes §3629 provides the following lien:
"The amount due by any delinquent officer is declared
to be a lien upon the lands, tenements and hereditaments
of such officer and his sureties, from the date of a levy in
pursuance of the warrant of distress issued against him
or them, and a record thereof made in the office of the
clerk of the district court of the proper district, until the
same is discharged according to law."
ESTATES TAX
There has been a Federal Estate Tax since September 8,
1916. The law has been amended a half dozen times and
for its provisions it is always necessary to consult the latest
revenue law. The provision that chiefly affects the title
man is the lien of the tax which has been the same in all
laws. It has always been provided that "unless the tax is
sooner paid in full, it shall be a lien for ten years upon the
gross estate of the decedent." In the case of residents of
the United States there was a $50,000 exemption to all
the laws prior to 1926, which exemption was increased to
$100,000 by the 1926 Revenue Act, but there is no such ex-
emption as to non-residents of the United States. As was
said in Page v. Skinner,"0 "the imposition took effect at the
time of death, and the tax became at once a lien on the
property of the estate, enforceable by sale if not paid, on
proceedings in court."
The estates tax is not subject to the provisions 'of Revised
Statutes §3186 and becomes a lien immediately on the death
Is 298 Fed. 731 (1924).
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of the decedent and there is no provision for filing notice of
the lien.
The statute provides for the execution by the commission-
er of internal revenue of releases of the lien, but there is no
provision made for the recording of said releases. In the
matter of the Estates Tax the title man must govern himself
in accordance with the information as the estate derived
from the administration proceedings on the decedent's es-
tate.
VOLSTEAD ACT
A perusal of the National Prohibition Act, popularly
known as the Volstead Law, discloses various liens that
are of vital interest to the title man. We will take up the
less important matter first. Section 5 of Title 3 reads as
follows:
"Any tax imposed by law upon alcohol shall attach to
such alcohol as soon as it is in existence as such, and all
proprietors of industrial alcohol plants and bonded
warehouses shall be jointly and severally liable for any
and all taxes on any and all alcohol produced thereat or
stored therein. Such taxes shall be a first lien on such
alcohol, and the premises and plant in which such alco-
hol is produced or stored, together with all improvements
and appurtenances thereunto belonging or in any wise
appertaining."
The above section has to do only with industrial alcohol
plants, and is similar in scope to the provisions relating to
distilleries under Revised Statutes '§3251, which provided as
to distilleries that "the tax shall be a first lien on the spirits
distilled, the distillery used for distilling the same, the stills,
vessels, fixtures, and tools therein, the lot or tract of land
whereon the said distillery is situated, and on any building
thereon from the time said spirits are in existence as such
until the said tax is paid."
It is well to note that the liens provided by the two laws
quoted above are the first liens.
But the main troubles of the title man arising out of the
Volstead Law are caused by Sections 21 and 22 of Title
Number 2. Section 21 reads as follows:
"Any room, house, building, boat, vehicle, structure, or
place where intoxicating liquor is manufactured, sold,
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kept, or bartered in violation of this title, and all intoxi-
cating liquor and property kept and used in maintaining
the same, is hereby declared to be a common nuisance,
and any person who maintains such a common nuisance
shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction
thereof shall be fined not more than $1,000.00 or be im-
prisoned for not more than one year, or both. If a per-
son has knowledge or reason to believe that his room,
house, building, boat, vehicle, structure, or place is occu-
pied or used for the manufacture or sale of liquor contrary
to the provisions of this title, and suffers the same tp be
so occupied or used, such room, house, building, boat,
vehicle, structure, or place shall be subject to a lien for
and may be sold to pay all fines and costs assessed against
the persons guilty of such nuisance for such violation, and
any such lien may be enforced by action in any court
having jurisdiction."
This section of the act is an example of the exasperating
habit of passing a law creating a federal lien without stating
just when and how the lien attaches. Section 3 of the Vol-
stead Act provided a lien for certain violations of the War
Prohibition Act and provided that "said lien shall attach
from the time of the filing of notice of the commencement
of the suit in the office where the records of the transfer
of real estate are kept." Had such a provision been in-
serted in Section 21, our troubles as title men would have
been lessened.
Section 22 of the Volstead Act provides the method of
abating the nuisance declared by Section 21. This is the
so-called "padlock" law and under its provisions the United
States may proceed by a suit in equity to enjoin the nuisance
and prohibit the use of the property for one year. The
last paragraph of Section 22 is as follows:
"And upon judgment of the court ordering such nui-
sance to be abated, the court may order that the room,
house, building, structure, boat, vehicle, or place shall
not be occupied or used for one year thereafter; but the
court may, in its discretion, permit it to be occupied or
used if the owner, lessee, tenant, or occupant thereof
shall give bond with sufficient surety, to be ap-
proved by the court making the order, in the penal and
liquidated gum of not less than $500 nor more than $1000,
payable to the United States, and conditioned that in-
toxicating liquor will not thereafter be manufactured,
sold, bartered, kept, or otherwise disposed of therein or
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thereon, and that he will pay all fines, costs, and dam-
ages that may be assessed for any violation of this title
upon said property."
In connection with this matter of "padlocking" premises
under Section 22 we quote the concluding paragraph of the
prayer in a "padlock" case brought by the district attorney
of the Northern District of Ohio, Eastern Division, against
the violating tenant and the owner of the premises upon
which the alleged violations of the law occurred. This
prayer is as follows:
"The complainant further prays that this Honorable
Court shall enter a decree directing that no intoxicating
liquor as defined in Title II of said National Prohibition Act
shall be manufactured, sold, kept, possessed, or stored in said
premises, or any part thereof, and that said building shall
not be occupied or used for one year after date of said
decree, and in the event that it appears that the owner
of said premises had knowledge or reason to believe that
the same was occupied or used in violation of the provi-
sions of Section 21 of Title II of said National Prohibition
Act and suffered the same to be so occupied or used, that
this Honorable Court shall enter a decree impressing a
lien upon said premises, directing that the same be sold
to pay all costs and fines that may be assessed or imposed
against the person or persons founa guilty of maintaining
such nuisance."
Although the decisions under the Volstead Act are legion
there are surprisingly few which throw any light on the lien
created by Section 21, and these few are, as usual,
conflicting.
In United States v. Schwartz,77 Judge Anderson sitting in
the Massachusetts District Court decided that the owner of
the premises is a necessary party to a padlock case under
Section 22. On page 720 the court quotes the provisions of
Section' 21 creating a lien and then says:
"It follows, that, if the owner of premises, made a nui-
sance by his tenant, has neither knowledge nor reason to
believe that the premises are being so illegally used, no
lien would lie against the property for fines and costs
assessed against the nuisance-maintaining tenant."
On the other hand it was held in United States v. Boynton,
78
1 F. (2d) 718 (1924).
8 297 Fed. 261 (1924).
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and in DenapoIis v. United States,79 that the owner of the
premises is a necessary party to an abatement suit under
Section 22, commonly known as a "padlock" proceeding.
Also in United States v. Olzak,8 0 it was held that a lessee
who acquired his interest after decree in a padlock case,
had no right to have the decree lifted. It was also held in
this case that the New Jersey lis pendens law has no applica-
tion to a padlock case.
Also it was held in United States v. Lents,8 ' that since the
owner of premises is not a necessary part to a padlock case,
opening the case to permit infant owners to intervene will
not be permitted. The court makes this very significant
statement:
"So long as the National Prohibition Law has not been
repealed, those who deal in real property must inform
themselves where any injunction proceeding is pending
when they contemplate purchasing any premises."
It is submitted that the court which wrote the above
opinion had more enthusiasm for the enforcement of the
Volstead Act than consideration for the rights of innocent
purchasers. This decision seems to put the burden on a
purchaser or mortgagee of finding out who the tenant is,
which under tenancies from month to month or at will is
not always easy, and the further burden of searching the
United States court records to find out whether or not there
is a padlock case pending against the tenant. Since the
weight of authority is that the owner is not a necessary
party to a padlock case, the purchaser or mortgagee can
not rely upon a United States court search in the name of
owners only.
It would seem that there may arise out of Sections 21
and 22, Title II, of the Volstead Act, four situations that
ore of interest to the title man.
CASE A: A criminal prosecution for violation of the act
by the tenant and a fine imposed for such violation.
CASE B: A ciminal prosecution for violation of the act
by the owner and a fine imposed for such violation.
CASE C: A padlock case against the tenant-violator to
3 F. (2d) 722 (1925).
S: 6 F. (2d) 1014 (1925).
, 8 F. (2d) 432 (1925).
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which the owner is not made a party.
CASE D: A padlock case against the owner-violator, or
against the tenant-violator and the owner.
The fine imposed in CASE A is not, in and of itself, a lien,
but is a lien only if the owner "has knowledge or reason to
believe" that the law has been violated on the premises.
Just what is necessary to bring home to an innocent pur-
chaser or mortgagee the fact that the owner may have
been cognizant of the violation by his tenant is one of the
puzzles of the Volstead Act. Whether or not he has no
notice thereof until a lien has been impressed on the pre-
mises by decree in a padlock case following the sort of
prayer that is quoted above, is, in view of some of the deci-
sions quoted above, an open question. If the purchaser or
mortgagee cannot rely upon the existence of a suit to im-
press a lien, the burden is upon him to discover, outside the
records, who have been tenants of the property and then
search the criminal docket of the United States court in the
name of the tenants for cases involving violations of the
Volstead Act.
The only real "safety first" policy for title companies to
pursue is to locate, from the addresses given, all criminal
cases arising under the Volstead Act, in the title plant, in
the same way that all other instruments affecting the land
are located. This is the method pursued by the title com-
panies in Cleveland. This enables the title company to
place upon the owner, where it belongs, the burden of prov-
ing that he had no knowledge of the violation of the act.
CASE B presents no difficulty from the standpoint of the
title man. A fine against the owner-violator is necessarily
a lien, this being an exception to the general rule that a
fine is not a lien, until execution and levy. The ordinary
United States court search in the name of the owner will
disclose the existence of this lien.
CASE C presents the same difficulties as CASE A, as it
necessitates the same sort of investigation outside the re-
cords. Aside from investigation outside the records, the
title company's only protection is some system of locating
these cases in plant from the address given. Actual in-
spection of the premises may show that the premises have
been padlocked, and then again it may not, as the bond
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required by Section 22 may have been given so as to permit
the premises to be used. Attention is called to the fact that
this bond, unlike other bonds and recognizances except
supersedeas bonds, is conditioned for the payment of all
fines, costs and damages that may be assessed for any vio-
lation of the act upon the premises.
CASE D presents no particular difficulties to the title
man, since its existence may be discovered from the ordin-
ary United States court search in the name of the owner.
Enough has been said to show that the Volstead Act is
needlessly burdensome to the innocent purchaser or mort-
gagee, and to the title man searching titles for the pur-
chaser and mortgagee. This needless burden could be elim-
inated by providing in Section 21, Title II of the Volstead
Act, that the lien shall be operative against third parties
only upon the bringing of an action to impress a lien upon
the filing of a lis pendens notice as was required by Section 3,
Title I, of the Volstead Act, being that part of the act known
as "The War Prohibition Act."
This paper has grown to an unconscionable length, and
for the sin of undue prolixity the writer prays the indul-
gence of this association. His excuse is that the subject
assigned is a bigger one than he realized when he accepted
the assignment.
In his "Life and Letters of Thomas Jefferson" Mr. Francis
W. Hirst, in commenting on some of Jefferson's literary
activities, makes the remark that one way thoroughly to
learn a subject is to write a book about it. The writer can
truthfully say that he has learned more about "Federal
Liens," by writing this article, than he ever knew before,
and he has simply tried to pass along to this association the
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